by Matthew Dennis
[Editorial Notes: Nothing bad can happen when giving your writers creative freedom right?...]
While today Russia has a great deal of notoriety and is currently one of the most recognized nations in the world, this was not always the case. Russia has a long and distinguished history that is indicative of its standing in the world today, but to gain this status as a preeminent world power Russia had to rise up from the simple principality of Muscovy stuck under the much maligned ‘Mongol yoke’. This rise to become a fully recognized European power was not complete until the early 18th century, when Russia was under the rule of Tsar Peter I and replaced Sweden as the leading Baltic power while also placating the Ottoman threat in the South. Through a long struggle in the Great Northern War, Russia was able to increase its diplomatic standing across Europe while also gaining strategic lands in the Baltic. This war was inevitable if one simply looks at the geographic positions of Russia and Sweden. Indeed, the war can most effectively be looked at through the geographic lens. Not only did Russia solidify several of its previously threatened frontiers and borders, but the legend of the vast Russian interior was born. Despite becoming powerful in Eastern Europe, it was only after the Great Northern War that Russia claimed the geographic domination and diplomatic ability to be recognized as a legitimate Great Power.The Great Northern War: Russia’s Emergence as a Great
After the Time of Troubles, and especially during the latter half of the 17th century, Russia began to gradually accept the influences of western culture. This was necessitated by commercial contact with the post-feudal economies of the West. New ideas and technologies were exchanged that – whether passively or actively – were integrated into Russian society. Now, the Western influence was only fully accepted by the Russian elite, a tiny but very vocal minority in Russian culture. At the risk of alluding to Reaganomics, there was an inevitable trickle down to the masses of some of this influence and Russia was slowly on track to becoming a more fully accepted European nation. The first instance was in the army. In the years leading up to the Smolensk War in 1632, Russia went to great lengths in order to improve their army and defeat the Polish. Despite having foreign officers train their soldiers and importing Western weapons, the Russians did lose the war. However, the Western technology and training methods persisted and the Russian standing army became more and more Western throughout the 17th century. Another step towards Westernization was the cultivation of a strong foreign sector in Moscow. Western scholars, architects, engineers, and other professionals were invited and given land in Moscow to create a Western intelligentsia there. Still, Russia was decidedly backwards in comparison to the rest of Europe, the discourse at the time on whether or not Russia was even a part of Europe is testament to that. Despite the Western leaning in cities and among the elite, the average Russian peasant, who made up a vast proportion of the population, had very little knowledge of western culture and ideas. This perceived backwardness kept Russia out of the prominent diplomatic circles which, of course, meant that there was an ineptitude in Russian diplomacy. There was a kind of isolation to Russia at the time that was only exacerbated by the ineffective diplomacy. Furthermore, they were not well established on the seas, and trade was somewhat one sided between them and the rest of Europe. Russia needed a change in identity to achieve any iota of equality with the West.[1]
This change came with ascension of Peter I to the Russian throne. As Tsar, Peter immediately set out to make Russia an equal of the West, which he attempted to do by emulating the West. He drastically changed the culture of the Russian elite and created a gentry much like that of the established European powers. This new nobility was just the start of Peter’s ambition to reshape Russia into that of a more Western nation. His aggressive reforms took Russia from backwards to a nation brimming with the untapped potential to dominate Eastern Europe, though it was only through conflict that this was actually recognized. With Russia essentially being landlocked and unable to sustain a powerful merchant marine to better influence trade, Peter became obsessed with gaining a port on the Baltic; he called this Russia’s “Window to the West.” [2] The desire for a Baltic port would inevitably lead to conflict with Sweden, who essentially controlled the Baltic and was the leading power in Northeastern Europe. The provinces of Ingria and Karelia, taken from Russia by Sweden during the Time of Troubles, would restore Russia on the Baltic and diminish Swedish power. With Peter’s ambitions focusing on the West and gaining a naval foothold, the Swedish Empire presented a major threat. Sweden had grown into a major world power during the 17th century and maintained their Baltic hegemony with a powerful navy and territorial possessions in Northern Germany and the Eastern Baltic coast. They had even wrested control of Skane and the entrance to the Baltic from Denmark and thus could manipulate Baltic trade. Their utter domination of the Baltic region came into direct conflict with Peter’s vision for Russia and served to further isolate Russia.[
To combat this threat Peter began to engage in intense diplomacy with the equally threatened powers of Denmark and Saxony-Poland. This is surprising for Russia, given their failings in the past with diplomacy. This demonstrates that the Russians had developed a diplomatic corps capable of communicating with the West to further the ambitions of Russia. This can easily be attributed to the multi-year tour that Peter took of Western Europe and the visibility it brought to the Russian state. The benefits of turning toward the West were already proving to be lucrative. The Russian nobility was able to engage in diplomacy and now Russia had the allies needed to confront the Swedish threat. The most active contributor, diplomatically at least, was Frederick IV, King of Denmark. He wanted to reconquer Skane and take back control of the Oresund, the strait that gave access to the Baltic. The coalition with Peter I and Augustus II of Saxony-Poland, who wanted Riga and Swedish Livonia, was a brilliant move because it would force Sweden to fight on three fronts. Russia could invade Finland and the Eastern Baltic provinces, Saxony-Poland would be able to overrun the German provinces, while Denmark, in conjunction with Norway, could invade Southern Sweden. Sweden was aware of this multi-front possibility and had taken care to fortify its possessions in and around the Baltic. With this powerful means to defeat Sweden, also came with what appeared to be a perfect opportunity. In 1697 the young Charles XII had taken the Swedish throne in the midst of a financial crisis and it was unlikely that Sweden could even support the kind of military effort that would be needed to defend against multiple armies on multiple fronts. With the coalition gathered and the opportunity present, the war began in 1700 with the Polish invasion of Livonia and the Danish invasion of the Swedish vassal Holstein-Gottorp in Northern Germany.[4]
The Swedish responded very quickly however and landed troops in Denmark that soon threatened Copenhagen. With pressure from the Maritime Powers, England and The Netherlands, the Danes were forced into peace before the first Russian soldiers even left Moscow. This was a devastating blow to the coalition and proved that their alliance was not as durable as had been thought. Charles XII was a dynamic and powerful ruler who managed Sweden’s war brilliantly. The perceived Swedish weakness was hugely overestimated and their armies swept across the lands of the coalition. Failure in Livonia by Saxony-Poland was also a major setback and freed thousands of Swedish soldiers after the Saxons went into Winter quarters in late October. Augustus II had attempted to siege Riga but the lack of ammunition for Saxon siege artillery and the ability of the Swedish navy to supply the city thwarted his efforts. The newly available Swedish soldiers were sent to relieve the Russian siege at Narva. The Russian front was the only active part of what was initially supposed to be a three front effort. At Narva a Swedish army of around 12,000 men, commanded personally by Charles XII, attacked a Russian force of nearly 40,000 under the cover of a snowstorm. The Swedes advanced in two columns and broke the Russian army into three parts. The fractured army was surrounded and trapped in the very fortifications meant to stop the Swedes. The Russians were routed and the army was utterly destroyed. More critically, almost all of the Russian artillery and military equipment was captured. This loss in the face of a numerically inferior Swedish army made Russia the laughingstock of Europe and infuriated Peter. However, the loss wasn’t really surprising because the aggressive military reforms of Peter had only started the year before and the army was mostly made up undisciplined new recruits. Regardless, the defeat stripped Peter of any offensive capability and took Russia out of the war for the time being. With Russia defeated, Charles XII turned his attention toward Augustus II and Saxony-Poland. The Swedish army rapidly advanced into Poland and from 1702-1706 defeated the combined Saxon and Polish forces again and again. The Polish army had little military capability and the Saxon forces, while well-disciplined and experienced, were annihilated once their allies failed to put up any effective resistance. After destroying the Polish, Charles XII moved into Saxony and decisively defeated Augustus II and put a new ruler on the Polish throne. Now Russia was the sole remnant of the Coalition that had once appeared to be so powerful.[5]
From his base in Poland, Charles XII invaded Russia with his Continental Army, the largest and most experienced Swedish army, in 1708. However, while Charles had been busy in Poland, Peter had been equally active. With the disaster at Narva behind him, Peter had hired hundreds of foreign officers to improve his army and had constructed a large and capable fighting force. The morale of the Russian army had also been restored with gains made in the Livonia and Estonia and vengeance for the defeat at Narva after the fortress fell in 1704. These battles had created a core of veterans in an otherwise freshly recruited army that had not been present at the beginning of the war. With a rebuilt army and a solidified position, Russia would prove to be a much different enemy than they had been at the start of the war. Regardless, the Swedish army was extremely well trained and very experienced, and they relentlessly advanced into the Russian heartland. This relentless advance was quite costly though, the Russians practiced a scorched earth policy and effectively used the geographical constraints of the land to harass the Swedes. The Swedish took constant losses with every mile they advanced as their strength dwindled. This all too familiar Russian strategy of allowing an enemy to advance into their nation only to be deprived of resupply worked just as well on the Swedes as it worked on Napoleon and Hitler. Still, Charles XII was no fool and his advance was slow and methodical in an attempt to limit attrition. Before wintering, Charles took a surprise turn South into Ukraine where he hoped to gain Cossack allies and avoid the scorched earth tactic that had resulted in a dearth of local resources. This move is often criticized, but the justification is clear when the possibility of better supplies and an intervention from the Ottomans is considered. After a brutal Winter that sapped the strength of both sides, the decisive battle that Charles had sought had not materialized. However, the Russians easily replaced their losses while the Swedish found it difficult to maintain the fighting strength of their regiments. The advance continued in the Spring and it was not until Charles crossed the Dneiper that Peter was ready to fight.[6]
The decisive Battle of Poltava saw the realization of Peter’s military reforms as the Russian army defeated the Swedish and destroyed the Continental Army. After a typically brutal Winter, Charles XII’s initial force of over 40,000 had been reduced to barely 20,000 and he was short of supplies. He set out to siege Poltava in an attempt to gain supplies from city and create a base to re-equip his army. This is where Peter decided to engage the Swedes once and for all. Peter’s massive army of 80,000 marched to relieve the siege and invoke a decisive battle. While Peter made the initial move, it was the Swedish who chose, characteristically, to attack. The Russians heeded the lessons they learned in defeat and used the advice of foreign military engineers to construct powerful fortifications to counter the aggressive Swedish tactics. When the Swedes did attack, expecting to surround and then destroy the Russian encampment as they had done at Narva, they were stymied by an impressive series of redoubts and their soldiers were subjected to effective artillery fire that caused the left flank of their army to crumble and retreat. The Swedish army broke through, however, and managed to assault the Russian camp. Though, this time the Russians made good use of their massive numerical advantage and brought their army out onto the field. With this move the overwhelming firepower of the Russians reduced the Swedes and forced their army into a general retreat. Several days later the entire Swedish Continental Army surrendered, a total of 17,000 men. Charles XII escaped into exile in the Ottoman Empire and tried to persuade them into an intervention from the South. Nevertheless, the Swedish Army in mainland Europe had been thoroughly defeated. Poltava showed the rest of Europe that Peter had transformed the Russian military into a powerful force that could defeat the best Europe had to offer.[7]
The victory at Poltava gave Russia and Peter an elevated status in Europe. The battle caused great celebration throughout Russia, including a massive parade in Moscow that celebrated the Russia culture. Peter used the victory to take the title of emperor, thus creating the Russian Empire. This western title was a sign of his new prestige as the head of the powerful Russian state. The triumph of the Russians on their own soil gave a sizable morale increase and the country was the best equipped of all the warring parties to continue the fighting. The secondary effect of the battle was to reestablish the coalition. With the destruction of the main Swedish army, both Denmark and Saxony reentered the war against Sweden. A now way overextended Swedish military was almost powerless to stop the loss of the remaining Swedish possessions in Germany and the Southeastern Baltic coast while Charles XII remained in exile in the Ottoman Empire. Charles became desperate while watching his possessions slip away from afar and convinced the Ottomans to attack Russia at a perceived moment of vulnerability in the South.[8]
The war that came out of Charles’ efforts was nothing of the sort he desired. The Pruth Campaign was short lived, and while the Ottomans completely surrounded and captured Peter and his army, they had no desire to take advantage of this and settled on a relatively easy peace treaty. The Russians were forced to return Azov to the Ottomans and stop interfering in the affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Peter was allowed to escape with most of his army while Charles was given safe passage back to Sweden. In this settlement Peter attained victory over Charles despite the defeat at the hands of the Ottomans. In reality, the terms were light and the Russians succeeded strategically through diplomacy to continue the war against Sweden unhindered. The Russian ability to end this war on favorable terms is testament to their increased prestige and newfound hierarchy on the world stage after proving their mettle in combat. This also was the last time the Ottomans were able to strong arm the Russians, as after Pruth the balance of power would shift in favor of Russia. With a solidified Southern border by virtue of the long peace treaty with the Ottomans, Peter turned his attention to the Baltic.[9]
After it became obvious that no more Ottoman aid was forthcoming, Charles returned to Sweden and attempted to turn the tide of a war that had gone decidedly in favor of Russia and the newly reformed coalition. Swedish Pomerania soon fell in the face rejuvenated of Saxon and Russian troops while Denmark and Norway applied pressure in the West and Peter marched his vast Russian armies into Finland. A new development was realized at the Battle of Gangut when a massive Russian fleet overpowered a smaller Swedish squadron. While the destruction of this small Swedish detachment isn’t all that significant, the fact that the Russians had created a navy large enough to control the Baltic was huge. Armed with a powerful navy, the Russians occupied all of Finland and expelled the remaining Swedish soldiers from Livonia and Estonia. The loss of several key fortress such as Stralsund on the German Baltic Coast meant that the Swedes were now forced back onto their sole remaining possession, that of Sweden itself. With the entrance of Prussia and Hannover into the war Sweden was massively outnumbered and had no chance to escape from the war with its Baltic hegemony intact. Nevertheless, Charles XII continued the war until his death in battle in 1718. After Charles died, the military capabilities of Sweden were gone and the nation was bankrupt with the rising costs of defending their shrinking borders, his leadership being the only thing keeping the Swedes in the war. Sweden then sought peace amongst growing international pressure and with the help of France as an intermediary.[10]
Peace was a complicated matter, however. Russia had grown to be a great European power and was now considered a threat. Russian armies were deployed all along the Baltic from Finland to Denmark. Russian fleets had destroyed the once powerful Swedish navy and were raiding enemy ports in the Baltic. Many rulers throughout Western Europe feared that Peter would establish a naval base in Mecklenburg and extend Russia power into Germany and take the place of the Swedes by creating a Baltic hegemony. Thus, as Denmark-Norway, Saxony-Poland, and Prussia all began to withdraw from the war, Russia had to fight on as the diplomats of Europe sought some way to keep Sweden powerful enough to serve as a buffer against Russian expansion.[11] The balance of power had been reset with Russia eclipsing Sweden and now effectively rivaling the Ottomans. With the Northern frontier secured, the Russians were free to expand into Asia and, for the first time, attack the Ottomans with superior military capability. The two main threats to Russia were no longer the blockade to expansion they were in the 17th century. Coupled with the rapid Polish decline, there really weren’t many obstacles to prevent Russia from dominating all of Eastern Europe. This potential left the future of the European balance of power in question. Combined with Spain’s sharp decline, the established European powers were left deeply worried about Peter’s ambition as the head of a modern Russia with designs to be the sole power in Eastern Europe.[12]
At the helm of a new world power, Peter sought to establish a new capital on his freshly conquered ‘window to the sea’ that would represent the more European and westernized Russia. Building this new city, with the notion of self-aggrandizement in mind it was named St. Petersburg, on the recently acquired land of Ingria served not only to legitimize the conquest but also created an immediately prominent port to house the now strong Russia navy and project Russian power throughout the Baltic. St. Petersburg itself was a myriad of Western style palaces, mansions, administrative buildings, and churches. However, it had no true identity and was the creation of Italian, German, French, and other European architects; a list notably absent of Russia. It was a city for Peter’s desired image of Russia, not the reality. It was a city for the nobility and for the Tsar, not for the people, and certainly not for Russian culture. St. Petersburg was something of an embassy to show Russia’s apparent modernity to various European diplomats and scholars. Moscow was still a powerful symbol of traditional Russia and remained prominent in Russian culture. Though, despite the failure to accurately represent Russia, St. Petersburg was a testament to the development of the Russian state and its emergence into European politics.[13]
As often happens throughout Russian history, major change is precipitated by conflict. The Great Northern War only had one victor, and that was Russia. Even the other members of the coalition were subject to negative effects. Poland collapsed and Saxony’s bid to become a European power went with it. Denmark never got what it wanted out of the war and continued to decline as potential Baltic power. Sweden was, of course, devastated. Its entire Baltic empire, except for some negligible lands in Pomerania, was gone. It had been supplanted by Russia as the leading Northeastern power. After the war, Russian power projection in Europe was strong enough to attract allies like Britain and Austria. The idea that Russian soldiers could be deployed across Europe to act as a policing force was actually practical. So dramatic was the change in Russian fortunes that it went from being some isolated and backwards country in the East, that many didn’t even consider European, to being the biggest threat to European stability by 1720. It is also incredible to note that before battles such as Gangut, Russia had no naval tradition and essentially imported foreign officers to rapidly deploy the strongest navy in the Baltic during the Great Northern War. Russia’s diplomatic presence was fully recognized for the first time and the stage was set for the Russian soldiers to relentlessly expand an already powerful state. Russia’s long rise to prominence was finally fulfilled under the ambitious rule of Peter I, aptly given the suffix ‘The Great’.
Works Cited
Black, Jeremy. European International Relations: 1648-1815. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Print.
Frost, Robert I. The Northern Wars: 1558-1721. Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited,
2000. Print.
Khodarkovsky, Michael. Russian History: Empire Building. Loyola University Chicago, Spring
Semester 2016. Lecture.
Kliuchevsky, V.O. Translated by Natalie Duddington. A Course in Russian History: The
Seventeenth Century. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968. Print.
Kamenskii, Aleksander B. Translated by David Griffiths. The Russian Empire in the Eighteenth
Century: Searching for a Place in the World. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997. Print.
Sumner, B.H. Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia. London: English Universities Press
LTD, 1950. Print.
[1] Kliuchevsky, V.O. Translated by Natalie Duddington. A Course in Russian History: The Seventeenth Century. Pages 275-300.
[2] Khodarkovsky, Michael. Russian History: Empire Building. Loyola University Chicago, Spring Semester 2016. Lecture, 17 March 2016.
[3] Sumner, B.H. Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia. London: English Universities Press LTD, 1950. Pages 51-55.
[4] Black, Jeremy. European International Relations: 1648-1815. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Pages 107-109.
[5] Frost, Robert I. The Northern Wars: 1558-1721. Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited, 2000. Pages 226-235, 243-250.
[6] Frost, Robert I. The Northern Wars: 1558-1721. Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited, 2000. Pages 286-290.
[7] Frost, Robert I. The Northern Wars: 1558-1721. Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited, 2000. Pages 290-294.
[8] Kamenskii, Aleksander B. Translated by David Griffiths. The Russian Empire in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for a Place in the World. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997. Pages 91-94.
[9] Sumner, B.H. Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia. London: English Universities Press LTD, 1950. Pages 74-86.
[10] Frost, Robert I. The Northern Wars: 1558-1721. Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited, 2000. Pages 294-296, 304-306.
[11] Black, Jeremy. European International Relations: 1648-1815. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Pages 114-120.
[12] Kamenskii, Aleksander B. Translated by David Griffiths. The Russian Empire in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for a Place in the World. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997. Pages 108-112
[13] Sumner, B.H. Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia. London: English Universities Press LTD, 1950. Pages 198-202
